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Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly novel hardware and software 
compositions creating smart, autonomously acting devices, enabling efficient end-to-end 
workflows and new forms of user-machine interaction. The heterogeneous, evolving and 
distributed nature of CPS means that there is little chance of performing a top down 
development or anticipating all critical requirements such devices will need to satisfy 
individually and collectively. This paper describes an approach to verifying system 
requirements, when they become known, by performing an automated refinement check of 
its composed components abstracted from the actual implementation. This work was 
sponsored by the Charles Stark Draper Laboratories under the DARPA HACMS project.  
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1 Introduction 
Autonomy does not reside in one particular software system or Electronic Control Unit (ECU). 
Autonomy arises out of the collection of ECUs responsible for: processing sensor inputs, i.e. 
perceiving; deciding what to do; and acting upon the decision made. Establishing the safety 
of an autonomous system, therefore, means assuring the composition, of these Perceive-
Decide-Act functions, is safe. There is currently a lot of work on the development of driverless 
cars as well as other autonomous air and maritime vehicles. In the automotive sector a 
manufacturer might well develop the decision-making software themselves, but their business 
model depends upon buying and integrating third-party ECUs from their supply chain with 
decision-making software. For example, Bosch supplies systems to many car manufacturers 
and their software design is their protected IP. This means that autonomy relies upon third-
party software for which limited assurance is available. To varying degrees the same is true of 
the aerospace and maritime sectors. 
 
More generally Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly novel hardware and software 
compositions creating smart, autonomously acting devices, enabling efficient end-to-end 
workflows and new forms of user-machine interaction. Currently CPS range from large 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems (which manage physical 
infrastructure) to medical devices such as pacemakers and insulin pumps, to vehicles such as 
airplanes and satellites. In the future they will include low power small devices that will make 
up the Internet of Things. 
 
Clearly resilience, safety, security and privacy are of paramount concern. However, the 
heterogeneous, evolving and distributed nature of CPS means that there is little chance of 
performing a top down development or anticipating all critical requirements such devices will 
need to satisfy individually and collectively. 
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The looming problem is therefore how to address the verification and validation of such 
systems when they are critical and rely upon other systems that have limited assurance? Worse 
still, how can CPS be verified when the requirements will not be known until after they are 
deployed and composed with other CPS to form unanticipated critical services? 
  
An approach to addressing this problem is to automatically extract the behaviours of such 
deployed systems that are composed together through well-defined architectures, or protocols. 
At this point system requirements can be articulated because the overall system of systems has 
been constructed for some purpose. This means that a system level representation of the 
relevant behaviours is needed. 
 
The importance of pushing the representation up to the level of system properties is that it is 
the natural level for people to articulate requirements, it is often difficult to express these as 
lower level specifications for components unless it is part of a top down development. Such 
top down development has already been excluded from the problem space being addressed. 
Verifying components against specified lower level properties that are generally desirable is 
rather hit and miss. The history of developing secure systems is strewn with examples of 
systems where low level security properties to hold, but the system is insecure. Conversely it is 
also possible for the system level to be secure, but low level vulnerabilities to be present – but 
not exploitable at the system level. There is no reason to believe that the same is not true for 
systems that are required to be safe. 
 
Another advantage of working with system level requirements is that they can guide what 
behaviours are relevant to the system level requirements, i.e. they drive relevant abstractions 
that can be performed. For example a sub-system on a CAN bus might have no relevant critical 
behaviour except that it does not flood the CAN bus with messages when critical messages are 
being passed between other sub-systems.  
 
In the past the approach advocated in this paper would have been perceived to have too many 
obstacles for any chance of success. Advances in various areas of automated reasoning and 
model checking now, perhaps, make such an approach possible. In the rest of the paper a small 
example representing encrypted communication to a hobbyist quadcopter is given to illustrate 
the approach. The software written in C is abstracted to a system level and then verified 
against a property that encodes the sort of attack a penetration tester might try. Finally future 
work that employs de-compilation of executable binary into a mathematical representation is 
outlined along with related work. 
2 The System  
The example of a system requirement used to illustrate the approach is that of absence from 
the system’s behaviour of one type of penetration tester attack. The simplified example system 
is based upon an early version of the SMACMMPilot [1] developed under the DARPA High 
Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) project [2]. SMACMMPilot is an open-source 
autopilot software for small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) using new high-assurance 
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The relevant part of the system for the requirement of interest is that of encrypted pairwise 
communication between a ground station and SMACMMPilot and a safety controller and 
SMACMMPilot, illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: SMACCMPilot communication channels 
 
Within the quadcopter’s software there are two channels: Stream1 and Stream2. Stream1 
consists of: an internal buffer (for the packets transmitted from the ground station), denoted 
GCSXMIT; a decryption function; and a process that assembles the message for processing 
according to the MAVLINK protocol [3]. A diagram representing Steam1 and Stream2 
appears in Figure 2. 
. 
 
Figure 2: Diagrammatic representation of communication to the quadcopter 
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Stream2 is a copy of Stream1. The implementation of Stream1 is in terms of 4 reactive 
processes that use 2 system services (send and receive) to communicate with each other. The 4 
processes are GCS, which models the ground station transmitting data; DLR, which takes the 
data from GCS and sends it onward to be decrypted; DECRYPT, which decrypts the data and 
sends it onward to be dealt with by RECVR before sending onwards to the MAVLINK 
protocol software. 
 
In the process algebra of Communicating Sequential Processes [4], CSP, the architectural 
composition of the streams of Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3. 
 
(STREAM1 [| {|GCSXMIT|} |] STREAM2) [| {| R2M |} |] MAVLINK(R2M) 
 
Figure 3: CSP composition of communication streams with MAVLINK 
 
STREAM1 and STREAM2 communicate through the messages over the channel GCSXMIT. 
MAVLINK communicates with STREAM1 and STREAM2 through the messages over R2M. 
The messages over GCSXMIT consist of symbolic values for a key, a sequence number and 
data. The messages over R2M consist of a sequence number and data. In CSP the composition 
of STREAM1 is in terms of the 4 processes GCS, DLR, DECRYPT and RECVR is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
STREAM1 =  
GCS(Sk,GCSXMIT)  
[| {|GCSXMIT|} |]  
( DLR(GCSXMIT, D2D)  
  [D2D <-> D2D]  
  ( DECRYPT(Sk, D2D, D2R) [D2R <-> D2R] RECVR(0, D2R, R2M.CMsgStruct.0)  ) 
) 
Figure 4: Composition of STREAM1 
 
The messages over D2D (like GCSXMIT) consist of the symbolic values for a key, a sequence 
number and data. The C code for the function GCS, is shown in Figure 5. 
 
void GCS(int Key, chan* out) { 
  SMsg GCS_local_message; 
  GCS_local_message.Key = Key; 
  GCS_local_message.cmsg.SeqNo = 0; 
  GCS_local_message.cmsg.msg.val = 0; 
  for (;;) { 
    GCS_local_message.cmsg.SeqNo = (GCS_local_message.cmsg.SeqNo+1) % 4; 
    send(&GCS_local_message, sizeof(GCS_local_message), out); 
  } 
  return; 
} 
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Note that the function GCS does not terminate because the ‘for’ loop, which calls a service to 
send a packet onward, does not terminate. The simplifications of functionality do not detract 
from the points this paper makes about architectural composition, abstraction and verification 
of system properties. 
 
The composition of STREAM2 is similar to STREAM1 (shown in Figure 4), but a process 
modelling an intruder’s behaviour replaces the process GCS in Figure 6. 
 
STREAM2 =  
INTRUDER(GCSXMIT, ICPY)  
[ICPY<->ICPY]  
( DLR(ICPY, D2D)  
  [D2D <-> D2D]  
 ( DECRYPT(Sk, D2D, D2R)  [D2R <-> D2R]  RECVR(0, D2R, R2M.CMsgStruct.1) ) 
) 
Figure 6: Composition of STREAM2 
 
The intruder’s behaviour is modelled abstractly as listening to the transmissions from the 
ground station and replaying them, or non-deterministically ignoring a transmission. The CSP 
process modelling this behaviour is shown in Figure 7.  
 
INTRUDER(in, out) =    
in?x -> (out!x -> INTRUDER(in, out)) 
|~|  
in?_ -> INTRUDER(in, out) 
 
Figure7: Intruder behaviours 
 
The behaviours of GCS, DLR, DECRYPT, RECVR and MAVLINK are determined by 
abstracting the code to a predicate representing initial and final states. The abstracted predicate 
is then translated into CSP enabling the overall system composition, shown in Figure 3, to be 
verified with respect to a property of robustness against a certain form of external attack. 
3 Abstracting the implementation into CSP 
MAVLINK is used to illustrate the abstraction of the C code (shown in Figure 8) to a 
specification and then translated into CSP. 
  
int MAVLINK(chan* in) { 
  SMsg MAVLINK_local_x; 
  do  
    { recv((SMsg*) &MAVLINK_local_x, sizeof(MAVLINK_local_x), in);} 
  while (1); 
  return 1; 
} 
Figure 8: C code for MAVLINK 
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The code simply acts as a sink for the decrypted messages, the extra functionality for a real 
implementation would simply be incorporated into the abstracted predicate.  
 
A tool, called FSG and developed by D-RisQ under the DARPA HACMS project, essentially 
generates the strongest post-condition for a C function. The tool, implemented on top of 
ProofPower’s QCZ [5] tool, generates as output the C compliance notation - a wide spectrum 
language that includes specifications in the Z language as well as C code. When FSG is run on 
the C function of Figure 8 it generates the specification statement shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: FSG output for MAVLINK 
 
The specification states that if the “do loop” within MAVLINK doesn’t terminate then the 
result is a relational closure called ‘DoLoop0’. Note that neither parameter to ‘DoLoop0’ is 
changed by ‘DoLoop0’. The point of the predicate is not to reason about it directly to establish 
some assertion; it is there to record sufficient information in order to translate into CSP.  
 
Figure 10: First refinement step 
 
The soundness of the abstraction is established by reversing it into refinement steps that 
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correct with respect to the specification statement. For example, Figure 10 is a refinement of 
Figure 9; and Figure 11 is a refinement of Figure 10. ProofPower’s QCZ tool processes these 
refinement steps to generate verification conditions that can then be proven by ProofPower. 
 
Figure 11: Second refinement step 
 
Returning to Figure 9, it is translated into CSP as the process MAVLINK defined in Figure 12. 
 
MAVLINK(in) = DoLoop0(in, (| |), SKIP ) 
 
Figure 12: Definition of the CSP process MAVLINK 
 
The communication channel ‘in’ is a parameter of MAVLINK, reflecting the channel ‘in’ 
passed as a parameter to the C function MAVLINK in Figure 9.  
 
The definition of DoLoop0 is a relational composition of a function called DoLoopBody0 with 
its own reflexive transitive closure, i.e. the loop body sequentially composed with a “guarded” 
set of all finite iterations of the loop body. The guard takes the form of domain restriction. The 
co-domain anti-restriction characterises the state on loop termination, if the loop does not 
terminate then this is the empty set. 
 
Figure13: FSG generated Z axiomatic definition of DoLoop0 
 
As the name implies, the “do loop” in the C code executes the body of the loop before the loop 
guard is evaluated. In this example the loop guard is true and the body is executed indefinitely 
giving the behaviour of a reactive system because of the call of the external function ‘recv’ 
used as part of the definition of DoLoopBody0 in Figure 17. The translation of DoLoop0 into 
machine readable CSP, called CSPm, is shown in Figure 14. It models predicate equalities by 
use of a let clause and then calls the externally provided function of a receive service that takes 
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DoLoop0(in_V, Indirections,Q) =  
let 
   recv__x = MAVLINK_local_x_L   
   recv__y = SizeOf(SMsg)       
   recv__queue = in_V           
within 
      EXTERNAL_recv(recv__x,recv__queue,Loop0,in_V, Indirections,Q)                   
Figure 14: CSP translation of DoLoop0 
 
The external function has two arguments that in the CSP are augmented by three more that are 
used to supply continuation information for subsequent behaviour. The augmented definition 




   Input_Channel = queue 
within 
      Input_Channel?Input_Value ->  
      let 
         Indirections1 = mapUpdate(Indirections,x_v',Input_Value) 
      within 
            P(i,Indirections1,Q) 
Figure 15: Pre-defined definition of the external service recv 
 
The argument ‘Indirections’ is a map function of the Haskell like functional language that 
augments the process algebra of CSP that is CSPm. The map function ‘Indirections’ models 
simple pointers, such as those used for efficient parameter passing. The process 
EXTERNAL_recv is defined by a human as part of the model of the CSPm model of the 
system architecture. It simply takes an input value received and updates the map function that 
models pointers. It then behaves like the process P supplied as an argument to 
EXTERNAL_recv with P’s required arguments, which also includes another continuation 
process Q. The actual parameter, Loop0, substituted for P in EXTERNAL_recv is shown in 
Figure 14. 
Loop0(in_V, Indirections,Q) =  
if true 
then 
    DoBody0_Star( in_V, Indirections,Loop0,in_V,Indirections,Q) 
else 
    let  
       MAVLINK_output = true 
    within 
          Q 
Figure 16: Process supplied as part of a continuation parameter in DoLoop0  
 
The continuation process Loop0, defined in Figure 16, corresponds to the translation of the 
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terminates and hence, in the process definition, the ‘else’ part can never be taken. In general if 
a loop terminates the process Q takes over the flow of execution. The CSPm definition of 
DoBody0_Star is translated from the FSG generated axiomatic definition of DoLoopBody0 
(used in the definition of DoLoop0 in Figure 14); DoLoopBody0 is shown in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17: FSG generated Z axiomatic definition of the loop body 
 
Although it looks (at first sight) to be complicated, Figure 17 is simply setting the 
abbreviations for expressions that are substituted for formal parameters of the external function 
‘recv’. For example the identifier ‘recv__x’ is an abbreviation for the address of a pointer and 
‘recv__y’ is an abbreviation for the size of the structure passed to ‘recv’. The identifier recvpost 
is the schema predicate that is the specification for the external function ‘recv’ and is defined 
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The translation into CSPm of DoLoopBody0 of Figure 17 is shown in Figure 18. 
 
DoBody0_Star(in_V, Indirections,P,i,j,Q) = 
let 
   recv__x = MAVLINK_local_x_L   
   recv__y = SizeOf(SMsg)       
   recv__queue = in_V  
within 
          EXTERNAL_recv(recv__x,recv__queue,P,i,j,Q)   
 
Figure 18: Translation of DoLoopBody0 into CSPm 
 
The definition of the process DoBody0_Star is similar to that of DoLoop0 defined in Figure 14 
and reflects the axiomatic definition of the loop body in Figure 17. The required recursion is 
achieved by supplying ‘Loop0’ as the continuation P (along with Loop0’s arguments ‘in_v’ for 
‘i’ and ‘Indirection’ for ’j’) that is supplied to EXTERNAL_recv in Figure 16. 
 
The translation of the reactive process MAVLINK into CSPm along with the similarly 
translated C code implementations of the reactive processes, which make up Stream1 and 
Stream2, can be plugged into CSPm system architecture definition of Figure 3.  
4 Verification of a System Property 
The encrypted communication over two streams (one for a ground control station and one 
potentially for a safety controller) is represented in CSPm as 
 
SYSTEM = (STREAM1 [| {|GCSXMIT|} |] STREAM2) [| {| R2M |} |] MAVLINK(R2M) 
 
Figure 19: CSPm SYSTEM definition 
 
The process MAVLINK is represented by the CSPm process 
 
MAVLINK(in) = DoLoop0(in, (| |), SKIP ) 
 
where the definition of DoLoop is derived from the specification  generated from the FSG tool 
that abstracts the C code implementation, as described in section 3. Thus the behaviour of 
MAVLINK instantiated with the channel R2M can be plugged into the SYSTEM definition 
above. Similarly the behaviours of the process that make up STREAM1 and STREAM2 can be 
derived from their implementation in a similar manner to that described in section 3. 
 
The quadcopter is a Cyber–Physical system that was initially developed without reference to 
potential penetration tester type attacks. A form of external attack is to interfere with the 
commands sent from the ground control station by replaying them through the second 
communication stream. A specification for robustness against this type of attack is that once 
started with a particular input stream, it must not be possible to receive messages from the 
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SPEC1 = R2M?CMsgStruct.x.msg -> SPEC1'(x) 




Performing a refinement check using the FDR3 model checker of SYSTEM (shown in Figure 
19) against the specification in Figure 20 returns a failure with a counterexample of 
undesirable system behaviour. The weakness is that because the implementation of Stream2 is 
a copy of Stream1 it can accept replayed messages from the other stream. The same system 
representation can be used to check other system security properties specified in CSPm. 
5 Related Work 
The High Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) project [2] is creating technology for 
the construction of high-assurance Cyber-Physical Systems, where high assurance is concerned 
with functional correctness and satisfaction of appropriate safety and security properties. The 
work described in this paper is part of the “Red Team” effort that is seeking to use 
“traditional” penetration testing techniques allied to analysing the system using automated 
verification. In section 6, ongoing work is discussed that seeks to de-compile executable binary 
into the C compliance notation from which a specification can be generated and translated into 
CSPm. Thus the aim is to use the C compliance notation as an intermediate representation 
generated from a de-compiler. 
 
Recent advances indicate that the time is ripe for verifying properties of systems. A number of 
projects on systems verification have emerged, most notably, the L4 verified OS Kernel 
project [6]. The project developed and formally verified a high-performance microkernel on 
ARM and x86 architectures. Such microkernels are a critical core component of modern 
embedded systems architectures. They are the piece of software that has the most privileged 
access to hardware and regulates access to that hardware for the rest of the system. Virtually 
every modern smart-phone runs a microkernel quite similar to seL4. 
 
In the rest of the HACMS project a clean-slate approach has been adopted using formal 
methods-based approaches to enable semi-automated code synthesis from executable, formal 
specifications.  In addition to generating code, HACMS seeks a synthesizer capable of 
producing a machine-checkable proof that the generated code satisfies functional 
specifications as well as security and safety policies.  Work on extending the verified L4 
kernel to an RTOS is taking place within HACMS. All the preceding work described involves 
top-down development of software from scratch where the safety and security requirements 
are known. The approach advocated in this paper aims to address software that already exists 
and when requirements only emerge later. 
 
Another notable example is the Verisoft and Verisoft XT projects [7]. They verify special-
purpose operating systems and a hypervisor, at the level of source code but without I/O. There 
have also been systems verifications that focus on safety properties, most notably, Yang and 
Hawblitzel’s type-safe operating system [8]. New supporting technology, such as 
programming logics for system source code, have been developed, e.g. by Shao's group at the 
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University of Yale [9]. In all of the above lines of work, verification assumes availability of 
the source code. 
 
The Research Institute in Automated Program Analysis and Verification [10] in the UK has 
two related research projects. The first is “Compositional Security Analysis for Binaries” that 
is translating binaries to C code in order to apply software analysis tools like CMBC [11]. 
However this approach is focussed on low-level properties, like zeroing of released memory, 
rather than system-level properties. The second project is “Program Verification Techniques 
for Understanding Security Properties”, focussed on source code rather than binaries, and is 
therefore not applicable to software that has already been developed. 
 
The VATES project [12] aims at verifying behaviour of embedded software at the level of an 
LLVM intermediate representation. It uses a top-down approach by inventing an abstract CSP-
based specification and then formally relating a model of a concrete system implementation, 
given in the form of the LLVM intermediate representation. This demonstrated that well-
established formal verification techniques for declarative process-algebraic specifications are 
applicable to low-level software programs. The VATES project developed a formal 
operational semantics of LLVM and established a bisimulation relation between LLVM and 
CSP models in order to prove that a given LLVM program is a correct implementation of a 
given CSP model. Again a top-down development was assumed and the translation from the 
intermediate representation down to assembly is just assumed to be correct. 
 
The most relevant work has been that of Magnus Myreen who developed an approach to 
formal verification of machine-code [15] that has been exploited to verify binary code [16]. It 
has been subsequently extended by Fox to deal with more ISAs [17]. Myreen and Fox’s work 
has so far targeted ARM, Intel x86 and IBM PowerPC processors with a proof-producing de-
compiler, which given some machine code for any of the processors mentioned above will 
automatically, via proof, derive a functional program from the machine code. This functional 
program is a record of the state change the machine code can perform. Although the approach 
only provides a low level description in Higher Order Logic it could form the basis for 
connecting binary executables to system architectures. 
6 Ongoing and Future Work 
Within the HACMS project, the lead organisation for the Red Team is the Charles Stark 
Draper Laboratories, or Draper Labs. Draper Labs are working on a de-compiler tool under 
HACMS. The HACMS de-compiler, called the Fracture tool, converts Executable Object Code 
for an Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) into an intermediate representation called LLVM 
[13].  
 
Current work on the HAMCS de-compiler is attempting to emit a representation, in the C 
compliance notation, from LLVM that is abstracted into a predicate by FSG and then 
translated into CSPm for the refinement model checker, FDR3 [14], to verify against system 
security properties. Work is also ongoing on the formal specification of a translator from the 
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Myreen’s de-compilation technology provides advantages over the use of Fracture and FSG. 
For example the Fracture tool does not provide any assurance of correctness against the 
semantics of the ISA used. The manipulation of LLVM and the translation into the C 
compliance notation is similarly unassured. Similarly there is no planned verification of the 
translation from the output of FSG to CSPm. As a consequence any reported violations of 
system properties may be false positives and satisfaction of the properties cannot be relied 
upon. Such limitations make its use questionable when safety is required, although its role 
within the Red Team’s assessment of systems is still useful.  
 
If Myreen’s de-compilation technology could be allied to a system representation, as illustrated 
by this paper, then system safety and security requirements could be established with high 
assurance and automatically. The gap between functional representations of binary executable 
in Higher Order Logic and CSPm can be addressed through the Unified Theories of 
Programming (UTP) [18]. An assured translator could be built on top of a current tool [19] that 
supports UTP and is built on top of Isabelle.  
 
To employ the FDR3 model checker for properties that were sensitive to data values would 
require a two pronged approach. One is to build data abstraction into the translation from the 
representation in Higher Order Logic to CSPm. The other is the development of a symbolic 
model checker for CSPm to assure such data abstractions. The capability of FDR3 to harness 
cloud resources to check over large state spaces means that it is plausible that embedded 
systems could be within the reach of automated verification against system properties. For 
example FDR3 checked a trillion states using Amazon’s EC2 web service in a few hours at a 
cost of approximately $70 [15]. 
 
The only part that could not be automated is the human understanding of architectural patterns 
used for Cyber-Physical Systems. Work on identifying such patterns is ongoing by Draper 
Labs. The specification of the compositional framework would have to be done by a human, 
but it is conjectured that there are a relatively small number of such patterns. It is envisioned 
that a library of re-usable compositions, like the one described in this paper, could be created 
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